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Zusammenfassung 
Die Demokratie wird heute nahezu weltweit als die einzig legitime Herrschaftsordnung 
angesehen. Daß sie in unterschiedlicher Weise institutionalisiert werden kann, führt zu der 
Frage, welche Form der Demokratie besser oder schlechter ist. Diese Frage kann normativ 
beantwortet werden, aber auch auf der Grundlage von empirisch feststellbaren 
Performanzen. Letzteres setzt aber eine theoretische Konzeptualisierung unterschiedlicher 
Typen demokratischer Regime voraus und die Operationalisierung dieser Typen durch 
Indizes. Das ist das Thema der Analyse. Typen und Indizes demokratischer Regime 
werden vor dem Hintergrund eines theoretischen Rahmens miteinander verglichen. Sie 
werden zu zwei allgemeineren Ansätzen zusammengefasst: dem Präsidentialismus-
Parlamentarismus- und dem Veto-Spieler-Ansatz. Das ermöglicht auch einen Vergleich 
dieser unterschiedlichen Vorgehensweisen bei der Konstruktion von Typen und Indizes 
demokratischer Regime. 
 
Abstract 
Today democracy is seen as the only legitimate form of government almost all over the 
world. That it can be institutionalized differently leads to the question which kind of de-
mocracy might be better or worse. This question can be answered normatively, but also on 
the basis of different performances that can be determined empirically. The latter requires 
an adequate theoretical conceptualization of types of democratic regimes and the opera-
tionalization of these types in the form of indices. This is the subject of the analysis. Types 
and indices of democratic regimes that figure in the current comparative and empirical 
research on democracy are compared against the background of a theoretical framework. 
They are categorized as presidentialism-parliamentarism-approaches or veto-player-
approaches. Thereby, the analysis implies a comparison of these two basic approaches to 
the construction of types and indices of democratic regimes. 
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1. The Issue 
 
Which form of government is the better and which the worse? Aristotle asked this question 
in the 4th century B.C. and his systematic attempt to answer it in ‘Politics’ can be consid-
ered the beginning of political science. With some brief interruptions, the attention of the 
discipline has since focussed on this issue. The first decades after the Second World War – 
when structural-functional and behaviourist approaches predominated in the social sci-
ences – experienced one such interruption. Political institutions as the constitutive elements 
of forms of government were considered as epiphenomena bereft of independent explana-
tory value (Rothstein 1996). It therefore seemed unnecessary to make a systematic distinc-
tion between different institutional arrangements and to undertake the empirical analysis of 
their effects. The only important distinction drawn was between democracy and autocracy, 
and in this regard – at least from a Western point of view – it was clear from the outset 
which was the superior form of government. 
Since the beginning of the eighties, there has been a renaissance in the study of political 
institutions. Probably the most important reason has been the ‘third wave’ of democratisa-
tion (Huntington 1991), i.e., the replacement of autocracies by democracies in many coun-
tries around the world. This democratisation wave reached a climax with the collapse of 
the communist system in the countries of central and eastern Europe. Since a democracy 
can be institutionalised in different ways, these countries face the question which of the 
existing forms of democracy ought to be introduced. In view of the problems of govern-
ability and legitimation, however, there is discussion in countries with an established de-
mocracy, too, about whether the form implemented in the country concerned is the most 
appropriate. The classical question of political science has thus been taken up again, this 
time, however, only in comparing different forms of democratic government and not all 
possible forms of government. 
A useful starting point in selecting and designing political institutions is previous ex-
perience with their impact in the real world. In this field, however, empirical research has 
so far supplied ambiguous and sometimes even contradictory findings (Tsebelis 1995). 
There are two main reasons for this unsatisfactory state of affairs. First, some typologies of 
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the institutional structure of democracies and the indices based on them have insufficient 
theoretical grounding. The result is a certain arbitrariness in the selection and operationali-
zation of structural characteristics. Second, the problems addressed differ considerably. 
Many more recent studies in which institutional variables play a role are concerned with 
providing the most complete possible explanation for the outcomes of political processes. 
Such an approach ‘…takes policy outcomes as its primary concern and works its way 
backward to institutional and partisan characteristics that are responsible for the production 
of specific policy outcomes’ (Tsebelis 1999: 591). However, if the primary concern is the 
quality of different forms of democracy, the procedure must be reversed. Instead of work-
ing backward from policy outcomes to institutional and other characteristics that explain 
them, it is necessary to work forward from institutional characteristics – and only from 
these – to policy outcomes. 
The question of the quality of different forms of democracy is relevant from the practi-
cal point of view for, among other things, the intentional introduction of a new or the ref-
ormation of an old system of government. This practical political relevance requires the 
focus of interest to be narrowed still further. Only institutional arrangements that can be 
laid down constitutionally can be deliberately designed. It is not by chance that in his study 
of ‘constitutional engineering’ Sartori (1994a) is concerned only with the constitutional 
characteristics of democracies. Lijphart (1984, 1999), too, who has relied strongly on char-
acteristics of the party system and of actor constellations in his analyses of contemporary 
democracies, has restricted his consideration of ‘constitutional choices’ (1991) and of ‘in-
stitutional design’ (1996) largely to constitutional characteristics. However, apart from the 
question of practical political relevance, it can in principle also be argued that a theoreti-
cally plausible concept of institution cannot be developed on the basis of empirically veri-
fiable regularities but only with recourse to legally codified normative expectations of be-
haviour (Fuchs 1999). 
The following study has two aims. The first step is a theoretical-deductive attempt to 
determine different types of democratic institutional arrangements. We use the established 
concept of democratic regime (Easton 1979) to refer to these institutional arrangements. 
The second step is to discuss the most important indices of democratic regimes used in 
comparative democracy studies in this theoretical framework. The indices concerned are 
Shugart/Carey’s (1992) and Sartori’s (1994a, 1994b) presidentialism - parliamentarism 
indices, and several indices that can be allocated to the veto-player approach. They include 
the ‘index of constitutional structure’ (Huber et al. 1993), the ‘index of institutional plural-
ism’ (Colomer 1996), the ‘institutional constraints of central state government’ (Schmidt 
1996), and an index constructed on the basis of a study by Tsebelis (1995). Lijphart’s 
(1999) two indices, each of which deals with a dimension of his fundamental distinction 
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between majoritarian and consensus democracy (the ‘executive-parties index’ and the ‘fed-
eral-unitary index’), are to be considered as belonging to the veto-player approach. For the 
sake of simplicity we use the authors’ names when referring to the indices. In this second 
step our main concern is to establish what the different indices measure at all and to what 
extent they are suitable for analysing the quality of different types of democratic regime. 
 
2. Typology Construction 
Our study is ultimately concerned with the quality of different forms of democracy. Any 
discussion of this issue presupposes the definition of such forms, and this is generally done 
by constructing typologies. In empirical democracy research, a multitude of democratic 
regime typologies has meanwhile been proposed, none of which has, however, managed to 
gain general acceptance. The most commonly employed is that of Lijphart (1984, 1999), 
but this, too, needs discussing, as we will be showing in the course of our analysis. These 
typologies raise at least three serious problems that impose explicit decisions. 
The first has already been mentioned in the introduction. It is neither very fruitful nor 
very informative to construct a typology of democratic regimes per se, as is often at-
tempted by comparative government studies in the classification of constitutions. What 
characteristics must or can be taken into account depends essentially on the question to be 
answered. Is the primary concern the effects of different types of democracy – and thus 
indirectly their quality – or the explanation of policy? 
The second problem is the under-complexity of typologies, which are based only on di-
chotomies such as unicameral/bicameral systems, federalism/unitarism, or two-party/multi-
party systems, and plurality/proportional electoral systems. Tsebelis (1995) has stressed 
that these dichotomies represent more or less important single elements in more complex 
institutional arrangements, which then constitute certain types. However, taking these indi-
vidual elements out of their institutional context can produce misleading results. If we fol-
low Tsebelis’ argument, we face the problem of which institutional characteristics to 
choose – and, in particular, how they are to be configured to form distinct types. A theo-
retical criterion is needed for this purpose. Tsebelis himself makes further suggestions in 
this respect, which we will discuss later. This takes us to the third problem, the choice be-
tween a deductive and an inductive procedure in selecting and interrelating structural char-
acteristics. 
The most prominent example of an inductive procedure is Lijphart’s (1984, 1999) ty-
pology of majoritarian and consensus democracies. Lijphart begins the development of this 
typology with a description of the so-called ‘Westminster’ model of democracy, with ref-
erence to the British system. On this basis, the ‘majoritarian democracy’ type is elaborated. 
  
4 
From the opposing characteristics of majoritarian democracy he constructs the contrasting 
type of ‘consensus democracy.’ Many authors similarly define ‘presidential democracy’ 
with an eye on the specific example of the United States. The problem with this procedure 
is that a democratic regime in a given country can exhibit a mixture of differing character-
istics. In Lijphart’s terminology, they can contain both majoritarian and consensus ele-
ments. The constitution of a country is not very likely to be consistently designed in obedi-
ence to only one principle. However, without an external and abstract theoretical criterion 
no decision can be made on the extent to which a specific regime represents a mixture of 
differing institutional elements or a ‘pure’ type of democracy. 
In his final typology of majoritarian and consensus democracy, Lijphart crosses two 
subdimensions, namely the ‘executive-parties’ and ‘federal-unitary’ dimensions. He ob-
tains these subdimensions through factor analysis of a large number of structural character-
istics. However, this permits determination only of empirical coincidence. The empirical 
co-occurrence of certain structural characteristics in itself reveals nothing about the attrib-
utes and effects of these structural characteristics and their combination. For example, it 
cannot be excluded that a quite specific combination of structural characteristics that is 
empirically relatively rarely has a strong impact on political performances. 
In our study these problems impose two fundamental decisions. First, it must be clear 
what end the typology serves, and, second, a theoretical-deductive procedure is advisable. 
In this procedure, the general standards for typology construction developed and justified 
by the theory of science provide initial orientation. According to Hempel (1952), a typol-
ogy should satisfy two main requirements. It should be as parsimonious as possible and it 
should have the greatest possible discriminatory power vis-à-vis reality. Furthermore, a 
typology should permit a clear and exhaustive classification of all relevant cases, and it 
should have the greatest possible explanatory power (Lange and Meadwell 1991). 
Discriminatory power and explanatory power can ultimately be determined only empiri-
cally. If these two requirements are to be met, a meaningful typology must first be con-
structed that satisfies the two requirements of parsimony and discriminatory power or un-
ambiguity. Parsimony is required in pursuit of the fundamental scientific aim of obtaining 
generalizable knowledge. Accordingly, a typology cannot be improved by making it more 
and more complex but by attempting to establish an optimum balance between theoreti-
cally justified abstraction from reality and the most appropriate description of reality. 
We attempt to identify fundamental dimensions and distinctions of a democratic regime 
to provide the basis for constructing optimally parsimonious and powerful typologies and 
for operationalizing these typologies. 
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3. Dimensions of a Democratic Regime 
Politics is concerned with the production and implementation of decisions with binding 
effect on everybody. The purpose of this function is to regulate conflicts within a collectiv-
ity and to attain collective goals. The ability to make and implement collectively binding 
decisions is termed political power; power can thus be understood as the decisive medium 
of politics (Parsons 1969; Luhmann 1974). But political power is a variable element, and 
this variability depends on two main factors. First, on the way in which power or govern-
ment is exercised, and, second, how holders of power or rulers are chosen (Loewenstein 
1957; Bobbio 1987; Sartori 1987). 
 
Table 1: General Types of Governmental System 
  Selection of the rulers 
  Self-selection Selection by the people 
Concentration in 
one institution 
Monocratic 
autocracy 
Monocratic democracy 
(antique democracy) 
Exercise 
of rule Distribution among 
several institutions 
Polycratic 
autocracy 
Polycratic democracy 
(liberal democracy) 
 
Combining these two dimensions with each of two forms produces a simple typology of 
governmental systems (see table 1). The decisive criterion for selecting rulers is whether 
they are chosen by the people and thus by the addressees of government, or whether groups 
and persons appropriate ruling positions by means of the instruments of power at their dis-
posal. The decisive criterion for exercising rule is whether powers are concentrated in one 
institution (or in one person) or whether they are distributed among several institutions. 
Four types of governmental system result: on the one hand monocratic autocracy or poly-
cratic autocracy, and, on the other, monocratic democracy or polycratic democracy. If we 
replace the Greek term kratos by another Greek word for rule, arché, autocracy and democ-
racy become monarchy (Steffani 1979) and polyarchy (Dahl 1971, 1989). The antique de-
mocracy of classical Athens, where power was largely concentrated in the popular assem-
bly, was monocratic democracy. Liberal democracy, in contrast, is polycratic democracy – 
or, in Dahl’s terms, a polyarchy – where the distribution of power among several institu-
tions is constitutive. Since practically all contemporary democracies are liberal democra-
cies, we concentrate our further analysis on specifying this general type of governmental 
system. 
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Table 2: Dimensions of Polycratic (Liberal) Democracy 
  Structural categories 
  Formal Empirical 
Exercise 
of rule 
Governmental 
system 
Relationship between governing  
and opposition parties 
Base functions 
Selection 
of rulers 
Electoral 
system 
Party 
system 
 
The specification of polycratic (liberal) democracy in table 2 is concerned with the struc-
ture in which the exercise of rule and the selection of rulers takes place. Two structural 
categories are distinguished: formal structure and empirical or informal structure. Formal 
structure is the constitutionally defined and thus legally binding set of rules laying down 
how the two base functions are to be implemented from a procedural point of view. Institu-
tions constitute distinguishable rule complexes with strategically significant functions 
within the overall institutional arrangements (Parsons 1969; Crawford and Ostrom 1995; 
Fuchs 1999). The selection of rulers is determined by the electoral system or electoral law, 
and the exercise of rule by the codification of institutions and their relations. The latter can 
be termed governmental system (see table 2). The governmental system and the electoral 
system together form the democratic regime of a country (Sartori 1994a). 
Political scientists postulate a second structural category, which is concerned with inter-
action between the actors of the democratic regime. This structure therefore constitutes 
actor constellations that are controlled by informal rules and which can be determined only 
empirically. They can in so far be called either informal or empirical structures (Easton 
1990). One example of such an empirical structure is the party system, which can be de-
scribed in terms of the number of parties and the degree of polarisation between the parties 
(Sartori 1976). A party system comes into being through elections; the outcome of elec-
tions is influenced but by no means determined by the electoral system (see the relevant 
arrow in table 2). Just as important are a multitude of changeable societal factors. Actor 
structures are therefore less defined, more variable, and less predictable than institutional 
structures. The question is to what extent actor constellations can be considered structures 
at all and in isolation from the specific level of individual and collective action. It is plau-
sible only if it can be assumed that there are durable constellations of actors to which indi-
vidual actors adjust and which constrain their behaviour in a systematic manner. To call 
merely temporary and contingent constellations of actors structures that constrain the ac-
tion of a given individual actor – as occurs in some veto-player studies – is in our opinion 
inappropriate. 
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Regardless of the conceptual problems involved in an informal or empirical structure, 
this category can be largely ignored for our specific purposes. We are interested in the 
quality of different democratic regimes that are constitutionally defined and can thus be 
intentionally designed. Given this focus, the formal (constitutional) structure of the democ-
ratic regime is the central concern of our analysis. The following section discusses the ba-
sic options for constructing typologies of democratic regimes. 
 
4. Typological Approaches to Democratic Regimes 
The fundamental criterion for describing and distinguishing democratic regimes is the dis-
tribution of power, with the two poles concentration and dispersion of power. In the case of 
a democratic regime it can only be a question of relative proximity to one or other of the 
two poles, for a minimum of power distribution among different institutions is a defining 
characteristic of liberal democracy (see table 1). The distribution of power was the aspect 
that dominated the constitutional debate in the 18th and 19th centuries – the terms then cur-
rent were the separation or division of powers – and is still the prime point of reference for 
almost all typologies of democratic regimes. In a democratic regime power is distributed 
among different governmental institutions. 
In this conceptualisation, the democratic regime is largely equated with the democratic 
system of government. The electoral system as the institutional mode of selecting rulers is 
taken systematically into account by none of the typologies and indices we have examined. 
In some indices it is merely one (additive) characteristic of the governmental system. Sar-
tori (1994a) considers the electoral system and the governmental system – as the two base 
functions of liberal democracy: selection of rulers, exercise of rule (see table 2) – to be the 
two fundamental dimensions of a liberal democracy. But he proposes no typology and no 
index constructed on this basis. 
The two fundamental institutions of the governmental system of liberal democracy are 
the government and parliament. Each of these institutions has its specific function in the 
exercise of power. The relationship between the two is the point of departure for one of the 
oldest and simplest typologies of democratic regimes: the distinction between presidential-
ism and parliamentarism (Loewenstein 1957; Verney 1959; Steffani 1979; Shugart and 
Carey 1992; Weaver and Rockman 1993; Sartori 1994a, 1994b). This distinction is initially 
somewhat misleading, for it suggests that presidential systems are not parliamentary sys-
tems. This is, of course, not the case. As in all liberal democracies, parliament has a ‘sig-
nificant’ function in the presidential system, too (Steffani 1979) – in legislation, in the 
budget, and in controlling the government. The difference between presidentialism and 
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parliamentarism lies in the constitutionally defined relationship between parliament and 
government. 
Two paired concepts are used to describe this relationship, which mean substantially the 
same: autonomy (presidentialism) versus dependence (parliamentarism) and separation 
(presidentialism) versus integration or fusion (parliamentarism). The meaning of these 
paired concepts is generally defined operationally by stating certain constitutional charac-
teristics. Shugart/Carey (1992) and Sartori (1994a, 1994b) describe a purely presidential 
system in terms of the following characteristics: 1. the president is both head of state and 
head of government (monistic executive) and he is also directly elected by the people; 2. 
the tenures of president and parliament are fixed and there are practically no mutual pow-
ers of removal or dissolution; 3. the president determines the composition of the govern-
ment and the decision-making activities of the government. Although in principle presiden-
tialism-parliamentarism typologies describe parliamentary systems in complementarity to 
these characteristics, they are less clearly defined. The most important characteristic of 
parliamentarism is the choice of the head of government by parliament and the responsibil-
ity of the government to parliament. The interdependence of government and parliament is 
most marked when parliament removes the government by a vote of no confidence, and the 
government can dissolve parliament (Loewenstein 1957). Both possibilities imply that 
there can ultimately be no fixed terms for parliament and government. These constitutional 
characteristics of the parliamentary system can, however, be frustrated if the government is 
formed by one party over a long period and can rely on a majority in parliament. The insti-
tutional design of the governmental system imposed by the constitution or by constitutional 
equivalents is then subordinated to the constellation of the party system. The political out-
come of this subordination is the extreme predominance of the government over parlia-
ment, as has been the case in Britain. And this is precisely the state of affairs that Lijphart 
(1984, 1999) has in mind when he proposes his ‘executive-parties’ dimension as a subdi-
mension of the democratic regime. However, as we have explained, such a constellation of 
government and opposition is the relatively contingent product of a number of factors not 
restricted to institutional characteristics like the electoral system. 
The archetype of a presidential system is the United States. The advantages and disad-
vantages of this form of government are often discussed on the basis of this example. The 
main reason why the fathers of the American constitution established a ‘system of separa-
tion of powers’ (Weaver and Rockman 1993: 2) was to prevent tyranny and any abuse of 
power. In the current discussion on the effects of presidentialism – and thus of parliamen-
tarism as the contrasting type of regime – this aspect has tended to be relegated to the 
background. Attention is focused on the efficiency of decision-making processes and the 
effectiveness of the intended policies (a compilation of this discussion is provided by 
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Weaver and Rockman 1993; see also Schmidt 1995 and Tsebelis 1995). It is repeatedly 
assumed that, because of the relatively marked autonomy of the government (president) on 
the one hand and parliament (Congress) on the other, the presidential system has at least 
three major disadvantages over the parliamentary system: higher transaction costs, less 
coherence among individual policies, and less capacity for political innovation. This as-
sumption, astonishing in the light of American history, would first of all need to be empiri-
cally verified by comparative studies – existing findings tend to be contradictory. But even 
if these assumptions are taken as premises, they raise two problems. First, the parliamen-
tary system cannot without further ado be described in contrast to the presidential system 
as a ‘system of fusion of powers.’ As far as the distribution of power criterion is con-
cerned, there is considerable variance within existing parliamentary systems. Second, the 
mutual independence of executive and legislature underlying the presidentialism-
parliamentarism typology is only one of the constitutional characteristics of power 
distribution (others include bicameralism and federalism). That the governmental system 
of the United States is empirically characterised not only by presidentialism but also by 
federalism and bicameralism does not necessarily mean that this is true of other 
presidential systems – and this is observably not the case. 
The fact of a plurality of institutional characteristics that play a role in the distribution 
of power is taken up by the veto-player approach and placed in a quite independent theo-
retical context. This approach refers explicitly to classical ideas of the separation of pow-
ers, reformulating and formalising them with recourse to theorems and methods taken from 
the rational-choice paradigm. Formalisation is concerned primarily with the relationship 
between independent variables (veto-player indices) and dependent variables (measure-
ments of ‘policy outcomes’ or ‘policy innovation’). In our context, however, we are inter-
ested only in ideas developed in the framework of the veto-player approach on distinguish-
ing types of regime. The best-known variant of this approach is that of Tsebelis. One of his 
definitions of the veto player states: ‘a veto player is any player – institutional or partisan – 
who can block the adoption of a policy’ (Tsebelis 1995: 305). An institution counts as a 
veto player only if it has a formal power of veto. The number of institutional veto players 
and their power of veto is defined by the constitution. In contrast, Tsebelis (1995: 304) 
sees the ‘partisan veto player’ as endogenously specified by the party system and govern-
ment coalitions (this corresponds to the empirical structural categories shown in table 2). 
Tsebelis’ dependent variable is ‘policy innovation,’ and both categories of veto player re-
strict the action of policy-process actors. In this way they determine ‘policy innovation.’ 
We are interested in institutional veto players. Tsebelis (1995) and Tsebelis and Money 
(1997) stress the particular relevance of two constitutional characteristics that define dif-
ferent institutional veto players: presidentialism and bicameralism. Federalism is also dis-
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cussed. However, it is not clear whether these authors see it as contained in bicameralism 
or as a separate constitutional characteristic. The question Tsebelis explicitly discusses of 
whether there are further institutional veto players and what influence they have will be 
looked at when we examine the indices of democratic regimes. These three constitutional 
characteristics coincide with the basic distinctions made by ‘traditional’ institutionalism 
(Loewenstein 1957). Presidentialism and bicameralism are concerned with the horizontal 
structure of the democratic system; the former with the relationship between government 
and parliament, and the latter with the internal structure of parliament. Federalism, in con-
trast, is concerned with the vertical structure of the democratic system. We can speak of a 
federal system when there are parliaments and governments with their own powers in terri-
torial units below the national level (states, provinces, Länder). In the political system of a 
country, these federal entities constitute veto players in policy formation, regardless of 
whether they are represented at the national level in a upper house. There is extensive and 
differentiated discussion on the importance and effects of all three constitutional character-
istics – presidentialism, bicameralism, and federalism. In the theory of Tsebelis – and in 
other veto-player approaches (e.g., Immergut 1992) – they are largely left out of account. 
Tsebelis (1995) and Tsebelis and Money (1997) relate these characteristics merely to the 
theoretical criterion of the distribution of power, and with respect to this criterion all three 
characteristics are functionally equivalent. In the concluding remarks we will address the 
question whether this degree of abstraction and the functional equivalence of the institu-
tional characteristics thus gained is too great. 
 
5. Indices of Democratic Regimes 
The preceding section dealt with two approaches to constructing typologies of democratic 
regimes, the presidentialism-parliamentarism approach and the veto-player approach. This 
section describes and discusses the indices that can be assigned to these two approaches. 
The two most important indices of the presidentialism-parliamentarism typology are 
those developed by Shugart/Carey (1992) and Sartori (1994a, 1994b). Both are concerned 
with only one characteristic of the democratic regime, the relationship (separation or inte-
gration) between the executive and the legislative functions. The decisive question for in-
dex construction is the operationalization of this relationship. Both indices assume an op-
erational definition of a ‘pure’ presidential system (cf. the preceding section). Sartori 
(1994b: 106) states: ‘… a system is presidential if, and only if, the head of state (president) 
(1) receives office by popular election, (2) during his preestablished tenure cannot be dis-
charged by parliamentary vote, and (3) heads the government or governments which he 
appoints. When all these conditions are met, then we doubtlessly have a ‘pure’ presidential 
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system’ (Shugart 1993: 30 offers a similar definition). On the basis of this definition, the 
situation initially seems to be clear: ‘Presidential and parliamentary systems are generally 
defined by mutual exclusion. … To be sure, a presidential system is non-parliamentary, 
and conversely, a parliamentary system is nonpresidential. However, division of real world 
cases between these two classes yields both incongruous bed-fellows and dubious inclu-
sions’ (Sartori 1994b: 106). The problem is accordingly to determine the categories that lie 
between ‘pure’ presidentialism and ‘pure’ parliamentarism. 
Shugart/Carey (1992) and Shugart (1993) propose a relatively complex typology that 
also constitutes an ordinal index: ‘1. ‘Pure’ presidential, 2. President-parliamentary, 3. 
Premier-presidential, 4. Parliamentary with ‘president,’ 5. ‘Pure’ parliamentary’ (see table 
3). What is particularly important in this typology is the differentiation of presidentialism. 
In contrast to ‘pure’ presidentialism, the presidential-parliamentary system has a dualistic 
executive with president and premier, in which the premier heads the government and is 
dependent on the president (e.g., Russia). In the premier-presidential system the executive 
is also dualistic, but the premier is independent of the president (e.g., Poland). Both types 
of parliamentary system are characterised by a monistic executive. In the case of parlia-
mentarism with a directly elected president there is a president directly elected by the peo-
ple, but he has either no or very few powers (e.g. Austria). 
 
Table 3: Presidentialism-parliamentarism Indices of Democratic Regimes 
Types Defining characteristics Examples 
Shugart/Carey (1992)   
1. Pure presidentialism - Direct election of the president 
- Monistic executive with president 
USA 
2. Presidential-parliamentary system - Direct election of the president 
- Dualistic executive with premier dependent  
on the president 
Russia 
3. Premier-presidential system - Direct election of the president 
- Dualistic executive with premier independent  
of the president 
Poland 
4. Parliamentarism with directly 
elected president 
- Direct election of the president 
- Monistic executive with premier 
Austria 
5. Pure parliamentarism - No direct election of the president 
- Monistic executive with premier 
Germany, Britain 
Sartori (1994a, 1994b)   
1. Pure presidentialism - Direct election of the president 
- President heads the executive 
USA 
2. Semi-presidentialism - Direct election of the president 
- Dualistic executive with premier independent  
of the president 
Russia, Poland 
3. Parliamentarism - No direct election of the president 
- Monistic executive with premier 
Austria,  
Germany, Britain 
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Shugart/Carey’s typology is notable for the asymmetry between the two poles of pure pre-
sidentialism and pure parliamentarism, which is not theoretically accounted for. Basically, 
it is not so much a presidentialism-parliamentarism typology as a presidentialism typology. 
Sartori’s (1994a, 1994b) typology is both more symmetrical and simpler. According to 
Sartori, the typology of Shugart/Carey is not clear-cut in differentiating the various types 
and is unnecessarily complex. He restricts himself to the three-way distinction between 
presidentialism, semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism (see table 3). Which of the two 
typologies is ultimately the more appropriate can be measured firstly by how well (exhaus-
tively and clearly) the democratic regimes of specific countries can be classified on this 
basis, and, secondly, by its explanatory power. However, this is not the purpose of our 
study. 
Whereas the presidentialism-parliamentarism typologies concentrate on this one struc-
tural characteristic, presidentialism in the veto-player typologies, which take this character-
istic into account, is merely one structural characteristic among others. Table 4 shows the 
selection of structural characteristics by indices of democratic regimes that we ascribe to 
the veto-player approach. With the sole exception only of Lijphart (1999), the authors 
Huber et al. (1993), Tsebelis (1995), Colomer (1996), and Schmidt (1996) more or less 
explicitly acknowledge commitment to this approach. 
The structural characteristics shown in table 4 are arranged in terms of the dimensions 
of a polycratic (liberal) democracy as depicted in table 2. This classification of characteris-
tics makes it easier to determine what the specific indices measure. One distinction shown 
in table 2 has not yet been discussed, namely that between the primary and secondary 
characteristics of the governmental system. This distinction directly affects the question of 
the importance and weighting of institutional characteristics. With reference to Tsebelis 
(1995), institutional characteristics can be classified as peripheral if they are relevant only 
for decision-making on certain subjects (e.g., independent central bank in financial policy 
and economic decisions), or if – under certain circumstances – they can merely amend de-
cisions that have been already taken (e.g., constitutional courts). Primary structural charac-
teristics are those that directly, permanently, and comprehensively structure or limit policy 
decision making processes. 
The index that differs most from all the others with respect to the selection of structural 
characteristics is Lijphart’s ‘executive-parties dimension’ (see table 4).1 It includes only 
empirical structural characteristics that relate to actor constellations. The other indices are 
based largely on formal (constitutional) structural characteristics, and mainly on those of 
the governmental system. Only Huber et al.’s index also includes electoral law, and that of 
                                            
1 The attribute “interest group pluralism“ listed by Lijphart has not been included in Table 4. According to our 
conceptualization it is no structural attribut of democratic regimes. 
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Colomer takes an empirical structural characteristic into account as well (effective number 
of parliamentary parties). 
 
Table 4: Selection of Structural Characteristics in Veto-player Indices  
of Democratic Regimes 
 Lijphart 
(1999) 
Huber et 
al. (1993) 
Tsebelis 
(1995) 
Colomer 
(1996) 
Schmidt 
(1996) 
A. Formal (constitutional) structure      
1. System of government      
a. Primary characteristics      
Presidentialism  X X X  
Bicameralism X1 X X X X 
Federalism X1 X X X X 
b. Secondary characteristics      
Constitutional rigidity X1    X 
Constitutional court X1     
Referendums  X   X 
Independent central bank X1    X 
EU membership     X 
2. Electoral system      
Electoral law  X    
B. Empirical (actor) structure   (X)   
1. Relationship between governing and 
opposition parties 
     
Composition of the government X2     
Dominance of the executive X2     
(Stability of the government)      
2 Party system      
Effective no. of parliamentary parties X2   X  
Disproportionality of elections X2     
1 ‘Federal-unitary dimension’ 
2 ‘Executive-parties dimension’ 
 
In the context of our theoretical distinctions, this extension is problematic. If the govern-
mental and the electoral systems are the two fundamental dimensions of a democratic re-
gime (see table 2), then they must also be equal in weight and systematically linked. 
Merely additively appending a structural characteristic of the electoral system to several 
structural characteristics of the governmental system is thus insufficient. A similar argu-
ment can be advanced for the combination of formal and empirical structural characteris-
tics. On the other hand, taking account of only one additional structural characteristic that 
does not belong to the governmental system in the case of Huber et al. and Colomer is of 
little quantitative consequence. Both construct additive indices of five (Huber et al.) and 
four (Colomer) structural characteristics.2 With the exception of Lijphart’s ‘executive-
                                            
2 With the exception of Lijphart’s (1999) two indices, all other indices are additive. Lijphart’s indices are averages of 
standardized variables. 
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parties dimension,’ the indices can thus essentially be considered as measurements of the 
governmental system. 
The five indices of the governmental system – Lijphart (‘federal-unitary dimension’), 
Huber et al., Tsebelis, Colomer, and Schmidt – differ in two aspects. First, whether or not 
they take presidentialism as a primary structural characteristic, and, second, whether they 
take secondary structural characteristics into account alongside primary ones. The indices 
of Lijphart and Schmidt take no account of presidentialism. This is somewhat surprising, 
because presidentialism is generally regarded as a prototype of a system of separation of 
powers (see especially Weaver and Rockman 1993, but also Tsebelis 1995). Lijphart 
(1984) offers an empirical argument for excluding this characteristic. In his factor analysis, 
presidentialism weighs only very lightly on the ‘federal-unitary dimension.’ In our opinion, 
this empirical finding is, however, not a convincing reason to exclude a structural charac-
teristic. If we take distribution of power as a central point of reference for the development 
of a typology – as Lijphart does – presidentialism is without any doubt an indicator of the 
distribution of power. Schmidt does not explicitly justify exclusion of presidentialism. 
However, justification for so doing can be formulated. The need to include presidentialism 
in a veto-player index is reduced in proportion to how far it is assumed that the effects of 
presidentialism can be attributed to characteristics other than the mere fact that the presi-
dent is an institutional veto player. Other characteristics that come in question are, for ex-
ample, the personalisation of politics in presidentialism and the strong dependence of the 
president on public opinion. This in turn would imply that the veto-player approach alone 
does not suffice to identify the different forms of democratic regime. 
Still more fraught with consequences than the question of including presidentialism in 
the typology is the second aspect of additionally including secondary structural characteris-
tics of the governmental system. This is done in both Lijphart’s ‘federal-unitary dimen-
sion’ and in the index developed by Schmidt. In both cases the number of secondary struc-
tural characteristics even exceeds that of primary characteristics (see table 4). This is espe-
cially important for Schmidt’s additive index, which assumes individual structural charac-
teristics to be equal in weight. This extension of institutional veto players has its advan-
tages and disadvantages. The disadvantages lie in their labelling as secondary structural 
characteristics. These characteristics have to do with institutions of the governmental sys-
tem that play a role in political decision-making processes either on specific topics only or 
after the fact. This state of affairs can either invite excluding the secondary characteristics 
from index construction, as Tsebelis (1995) does, or placing less weight on secondary than 
on primary characteristics. But there is no theoretical criterion available for such weight-
ing, so that this solution cannot be put into practice. A third alternative is to include secon-
dary structural characteristics in index construction only with respect to specific topics. If, 
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for example, economic performance is to be explained, the characteristic ‘independent cen-
tral bank’ would be included. But this would mean that different indices would need to be 
constructed depending on what policies are to be explained. However, if we want to judge 
the quality of different institutional arrangements, it does not make much sense constantly 
to vary the indices for recording these institutional arrangements. 
Although secondary structural characteristics can become players only on specific top-
ics, temporarily, and at a subsequent stage, it is quite possible for a plurality of such veto 
players together to constitute a democratic regime that considerable restricts decision-
making processes as a whole. This possibility cannot be covered by a type and index con-
struction confined to primary structural characteristics. In constructing an index, it must 
therefore be decided what weight is to be given to this possibility and whether the problem 
of implicitly overweighting secondary structural characteristics in the construction of the 
additive index is to be accepted. 
The theoretically less equivocal solution is certainly to construct types and indices only 
on the basis of central governmental-system structural characteristics. Tsebelis appears to 
have adopted this procedure most fully (see table 4). However, this is only the case for his 
selection of the institutional veto players to be considered in principle. Whether they actu-
ally do count as veto players is made to depend on another criterion. This can most easily 
be demonstrated in the case of bicameralism. Only if the majority relations between the 
parties represented in the upper house differ from those in the lower house does the upper 
house count as an additional veto player (Tsebelis 1995). If the same parties have a major-
ity in both houses, the two houses count as only one veto player. For Tsebelis, the status of 
institutional veto players thus also depends on contingent actor constellations. This means 
that the index for a given country can change over time even though the constitutional 
structure does not change. Tsebelis’ procedure can be useful if one is primarily interested 
in explaining specific policy outcomes, as Tsebelis explicitly states (cf. introduction). 
However, it is not an appropriate procedure if the prime concern is to evaluate constitu-
tional structure. In the following section we therefore construct an index that takes up Tse-
belis’ selection of institutional veto players but leaves their dependence on actor constella-
tions out of account. 
 
6. Dimensions of the Indices 
We have assigned the indices we have analysed to the presidentialism-parliamentarism and 
veto-player typological approaches. This has been done on the basis of theoretical consid-
erations and of self assessment by the authors who developed the indices in question. In 
this section we examine the extent to which this a priori assignment is empirically justified. 
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For this purpose we performed an exploratory factor analysis. In accordance with our allo-
cation we expect two factors. The two presidentialism-parliamentarism indices 
(Shugart/Carey, Sartori) ought to constitute the one, and the veto-player indices (Lijphart’s 
‘federal-unitary dimension,’ Huber et al., Colomer, and Schmidt) the other. 
Besides the indices already described, two others were included in the factor analysis: a 
‘minimal governmental system index A’ and a ‘minimal governmental system index B.’ 
Both are additive indices. They are termed ‘minimal’ because they are based exclusively 
on formal (constitutional) and primary structural characteristics. These are bicameralism 
and federalism in index A, and in index B presidentialism is added to these two 
characteristics. The ‘minimal governmental index B’ is thus a new construction, which is 
based on Tsebelis’ selection of institutional characteristics (see table 4). Of the eight 
indices included in the factor analysis, these two – together with Sartori’s presidentialism-
parliamentarism index – are by far the most parsimonious. 
 
Table 5: Factor analysis1 of the indices of democratic regimes 
 Components 
 1 2 
Indices (veto players) (presidentialism) 
Lijphart (‘federal-unitary dimension’) .95  
Huber et al. .85 -.39 
Colomer .84 -.42 
Schmidt .92  
Shugart/Carey  .98 
Sartori -.26 .95 
Minimal governmental system index A2 -.97  
Minimal governmental system index B3 (‘Tsebelis’) -.89 .42 
1 Principal component analysis: varimax rotation; explained variance = 92%; N = 23 
2 Formal and primary structural characteristics: bicameralism and federalism 
3 Formal and primary structural characteristics: bicameralism and presidentialism. 
Source: Lijphart (Lijphart 1999); Huber et al, Colomer, Schmidt (Schmidt 1996); Shugart/Carey (1992), Sartori (1994a) 
 
The results of the factor analysis are not very surprising (see table 5). Precisely the two 
expected factors or components are extracted: a component of the veto-player indices and a 
component of the presidentialism indices. However, there are some remarkable detailed 
results. The factor loading of all veto-player indices on the first component is extraordinar-
ily high. The indices that exhibit low loading are those that include presidentialism as a 
structural characteristic and therefore exhibit incidental loading on the second component, 
which refers to presidentialism. For the presidentialism components, the factor loading of 
the more complex indices of Shugart/Carey and the more simple index of Sartori are at 
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almost the same level. These results permit conclusions about the two problems of index 
construction we have already mentioned. The distinction between simple and complex in-
dices and between indices that are based only on primary structural characteristics of the 
governmental system or that also take secondary structural characteristics into account play 
no role in factor structure. All veto-player indices record the latent construct equally well, 
and the same is true for the two presidentialism indices. This implies that the more parsi-
monious indices, too, adequately measure the given latent construct. The practical conse-
quences for research will be discussed in the concluding remarks. 
Two further empirical findings should first be reported. One is concerned with the rela-
tionship between the presidentialism and veto-player indices. Shugart/Carey’s presidential-
ism index correlates with the three veto-player indices that contain only constitutional 
characteristics of the governmental system to the exclusion of presidentialism (Lijphart’s 
‘federal-unitary dimension,’ Schmidt, minimal governmental system index A) with an av-
erage score of r = .21. There is thus a certain link, but not a very strong one. Over and be-
yond the factor analysis, this result clearly shows that the presidentialism and veto-player 
approaches are not simply interchangeable. According to this finding, too, presidentialism 
is clearly not only a subdimension of the distribution-of-powers metadimension. 
The second result is concerned with Lijphart’s ‘executive-parties dimension,’ which in-
cludes only empirical structural characteristics or actor constellations (see table 4). If an 
index of this dimension is included in the factor analysis, then – in addition to the two 
shown in table 3 – a third component emerges, which is constituted by precisely this index. 
This empirical finding confirms our theoretical assumption that Lijphart’s ‘executive-
parties dimension’ records something quite different from what is recorded by all the other 
indices. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
Our study of the types and indices of democratic regimes has two general points of refer-
ence. The first is the evaluation of different types of democratic regime. This evaluation 
can be concerned with the political performances of the regime. The second point of refer-
ence is the intentional implementation of a new democratic regime or the structural refor-
mation of an existing one. Two conclusions must be drawn with respect to these points of 
reference. First, types of democratic regime can be distinguished only on the basis of con-
stitutional structural characteristics, for only this category of characteristic can be designed 
intentionally. Second, the type of democratic regime in a country must be determined in-
dependently of particular and varying policies. Two reasons can be offered for the latter. If 
a regime type is to be evaluated, it must, as the object of evaluation, be kept constant. Fur-
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thermore, such evaluation can be based only on long-term and comprehensive perform-
ances of the regime type and not on individual policy outcomes. The point of reference of 
our analysis is thus not the most complete possible explanation of specific policy out-
comes, which has hitherto been the goal of most studies in the context of the veto-player 
approach. 
On the basis of a theoretical determination of the concept and dimensions of a democ-
ratic regime, a number of common types and indices have been described and discussed. 
Two basic approaches to type and index construction have been distinguished: first, the 
presidentialism-parliamentarism approach and, second, the veto-player approach. This 
theoretical distinction has been empirically confirmed by factor analysis of the indices. 
The theoretically most unambiguous of the veto-player indices are those of Lijphart 
(‘federal-unitary dimension’) and Schmidt, as well as the two newly constructed minimal 
governmental system indices. All four indices are based exclusively on formal structural 
characteristics of the governmental system. Whereas Lijphart’s and Schmidt’s indices in-
clude primary and secondary structural characteristics, the two minimal governmental sys-
tem indices are restricted to primary structural characteristics (bicameralism, federalism, 
and, in one of the two, presidentialism as well). These four indices are the most appropriate 
for analysing the effects of different types of democratic regime on political performances. 
As the factor analysis of the indices shows, the latent construct – the extent of distribu-
tion of power, operationalized by the number of veto players – is equally well measured by 
all four indices. This result is important for research practice. If as many countries with 
democratic regimes as possible are to be included in the empirical analysis, the parsimoni-
ous indices can be used without the risk of ‘conceptual stretching’ (Sartori 1970; Collier 
1993). This concept was coined by Sartori to denote the problem of reducing the intension 
of a concept to increase the extension of the analysis. 
Another and still open question is which of the two basic approaches to type and index 
construction is the more suitable for recording the democratic regime in specific countries. 
The distinction between presidentialism and parliamentarism can be integrated in the veto-
player approach, so that it appears to be the more comprehensive. However, in the veto-
player approach presidentialism is only one among other veto-players and, in this sense, 
constitutes a functional equivalent to the other structural characteristics. Among the addi-
tive indices, the predominant measuring instrument in the veto-player approach, the char-
acteristics of presidentialism is accordingly simply added to the other veto players. How-
ever, it is still unclear whether this leaves peculiarities of the presidential system out of 
account that could have an impact on the reality of political processes. 
One such peculiarity is the focus of the executive on the president, which accompanies 
much greater personalisation of politics than in parliamentary systems. Another lies in a 
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follow-up problem of the separation of executive and legislature. As a result of the separa-
tion, the president has to rely on public opinion as a power resource. These two 
characteristics can lead to populism and to erraticness in presidential policy. On the other 
hand, they can enhance the legitimacy of the democratic regime if the interplay between 
the president and the public works. We need not settle this question here, but merely draw 
a general conclusion. In so far as these and other peculiarities of the presidential system 
play a role, it is inappropriate to consider presidentialism only as a veto player. It could be 
more useful to pursue a quite new typological approach that systematically links the 
differentiation into presidentialism and parliamentarism with the differentiation into 
systems that distribute power and those that concentrate power. First steps in this direction 
have been taken by, for example, Weaver and Rockman (1993) and Lijphart (1992). 
However, a theoretical criterion has yet to be found that permits the two dimensions to be 
linked systematically and not only voluntaristically. 
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